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Foreign banks play a large role in the loan sales market.  We examine this role using individual 
bank data on foreign-owned banks in the United States.  We find that the motives for loan sales 
and purchases differ between U.S. and foreign-owned banks and between foreign banks of 
different regions.  The evidence is consistent with foreign banks' using the market for 
diversification. 
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Amidst the trade in traditional goods, such as autos, rice, and Euroyen futures, nations along the 
Pacific Rim also trade an asset that quietly challenges banking everywhere: loans.  Increasingly, 
banks of all sizes are selling their commercial and industrial loans.  These sales take place 
without guarantees from the U.S.  government or from the selling bank, and without being 
bundled into securities. The effect is that loans are removed both from the U.S.  market and 
from the world banking system at large.  The extensive trade in what once was thought a closely 
held asset confronts bank managers, regulators, and policymakers with the need to rethink the 
role banks play in the economy and the role government plays in the banking sector.' 
To fully comprehend the loan sales market and its implications for financial 
intermediation, we need to understand the international side of the question. Large banks 
surveyed by the Federal Reserve in 1993 indicated that more than 85 percent of their loan sales 
went to foreign banks or to U.  S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. With foreign banks 
approaching a dominant stance in the loan sales market, recognizing this force is key to 
understanding market,pressures  and the effect of regulations -- the need to diversifjr, binding 
capital requirements, or a shift in regional economies -- on the loan sales market.  This, in turn, 
is a step toward understanding the basic institutional and technological changes that have 
allowed loan sales to become a feasible contract, and thus a suitable solution for these problems. 
The loan sales market is also important in assessing the true position of international 
banks. Terrell(1993) reports that at the end of  199  1  :IQ, U.  S. branches and agencies of foreign 
banks held $143.7 billion of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to U.S.  companies.  Offshore 
branches of foreign banks held another $78.7 billion.  All told, foreign banks held 32.8 percent 
of the U.S. C&I loan market.  McCauley and Seth (1992) suggest that foreign bank penetration 
The loan sales market may also be the key for reconciling the results of studies that suggest 
banking is a declining industry, such as Gorton and Rosen (1992), with studies that suggest 
banking is still viable, such as Boyd and Gertler (1 994). 
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at the end of 199  1. These estimates, however, miss the distinction between loans held and loans 
originated and thereby overstate the foreign-bank involvement. 
Operationally, because of data limitations we must approach international trade in loans 
in a roundabout manner.  Using the available U.S. data, we examine how foreign-owned banks 
differ in their loan sales activity and how foreign conditions influence the market.  By 
characterizing the determinants of loan sales and purchases, we hope to distinguish the 
important influences and motives for different types of banks. We use the individual bank data 
from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's (FFIEC) Quarterly Reports of 
Condition and Income (call reports) to estimate the determinants of loan sales and purchases. 
The sample period includes the recent recession and downturn in the loan sales market and thus 
provides an opportunity to take a deeper look at these issues. 
Our work builds on previous studies by Haubrich and Thomson (1 993) and Demsetz 
(1 993), once again using Tobit analysis.  This explicitly takes into account the many banks that 
do not sell (or buy) loans without ignoring the information about the volume of those who do 
participate. Unfortunately, it also makes correcting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
more difficult than for linear regression. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the basic 
details of the loan sales market, along with a simple theory we use to organize our thoughts on 
the subject.  Section 3, the heart of  the paper, presents the empirical results.  Conclusions and 
suggestions for future work appear in section 4. 
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A bank sells a loan by promising its payment stream to the buyer.2 In the most common type of 
loan sale (the participation), the original contract between the bank and the borrower stays in 
place, and the bank continues to collect payments, oversee the collateral, and examine the 
books.  In many cases (termed silent participations), the borrower does not even know the loan 
has been sold. 
Two legal and accounting issues shape the loan sales market:  Banks want to remove the 
loan from their balance sheet and also desire to avoid federal securities laws.  To take the loan 
off the balance sheet and treat the transaction like an asset sale rather than a borrowing,  the 
bank must show that the risk of the loan has been shiRed to the buyer.  This means the entire 
loan must be sold off, that the bank can provide no recourse to the buyer, and that the loan must 
be sold to maturity.  (See Moms [1991] or Gorton and Haubrich [1990] for more detail.) 
Banks sell several different types of loans.  A newsletter, Asset Sales Report, tracks loan 
sales for nine major banks.  As of January 25, 1993, the total balance outstanding for this group 
was $58 billion--$5 billion in loans under a year and $53 billion in loans with maturities one year 
or more. Maturity has increased as the market has developed. In the early 1980s, the banks 
mainly sold short-term (under 90 days) domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans made to 
investment-grade @BB or better) borrowers.  Since then, maturity has lengthened and loans to 
lower-quality borrowers have predominated. Among large banks, the share of outstanding loans 
sold that were obligations to investment-grade borrowers had dropped to 37 percent by  1989. 
Though many types of banks buy and sell loans, foreign banks have a particularly large 
share of the market.  An August 1993 survey of large banks by the Federal Reserve (discussed in 
more detail below) indicated that U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks bought 73 percent 
More detailed information appears in Haubrich (1989), Gorton and Haubrich (1990), and 
Gorton (1991). 
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and even nonfinancial firms also buy loans, so that some loans leave the banking system entirely. 
Loan purchases by foreign banks and nonbank firms limit the scope of our empirical results, 
which depend on the bank call reports, and so our results are restricted to domestic banks (and 
insured domestic offices of foreign banks). 
Another aspect of this market is its pricing structure.  Prices of highly rated loans closely 
track commercial paper and the London interbank offered rate (LEIOR).  Not surprisingly, 
yields on lower-rated loans show a greater spread.  The August 2, 1993 issue of Asset Sales 
Report lists the spread between the 30-day Al/Pl loan sales yield and commercial paper as 0 
basis points.  At times, short-term loan sales even sell at a premium.  For loans with a lower 
rating, A2/P2, the spread was 10 basis points.  . 
As a basic framework in which to think about the issues surrounding loan sales, we use a 
simplified version of the model developed by Pennacchi (1988).  This model is a state- 
preference version of the Miller (1977) debt model as extended to banks by Orgler and Taggart 
(1983). Corporate income taxation gives a tax advantage to debt, but debt increases agency and 
bankruptcy costs, providing a determinate debt-to-equity ratio. 
Apart from selling loans, banks have two sources of finds: deposits and equity. 
Deposits have a tax advantage in that their interest is deductible as a business expense, but have 
an additional cost of reserve requirements. Banks have a constraint on these finding sources, 
namely a capital requirement that the ratio of  debt (such as deposits) to equity not exceed a 
certain limit.  Without loan sales, the bank makes loans until the return on the loan, net of 
monitoring costs, equals the cost of finds needed to find the loan. 
The interested reader can also find more details in our earlier paper, Haubrich and 
Thomson (1 993). For somewhat different approaches, see Mester (1992), Carlstrom and 
Sarnolyk (1995), or Chen, Hung and Mazurndar (1993). 
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fraction of it.  This sold fraction is removed from the bank's balance sheet and is, in effect, 
hnded by the loan buyer.  Banks sell loans when they have a large supply of profitable loans 
relative to their knding and buy loans when they have a large supply of hnding relative to their 
loan opportunities. That is, for a bank with a low supply of cheap core deposits, loan sales 
represent an alternative to purchasing hnds in the competitive national deposit market. 
A bank with a good supply of core deposits but with fewer profitable loan originations 
instead resorts to investing in the money market. Along with the Treasury bills, commercial 
paper, and bankers acceptances, some of the investment may go to loan purchases. 
3.  Empirical Results 
Our goal in this section is to extend our earlier work on characterizing the determinants of loan 
sales and purchases--to find out what determines who buys, who sells, and for how much.  Here, 
we take a closer look at foreign banks,, one of the issues left unresolved in our previous study. 
Our main data -source  in this endeavor are the FFIEC's quarterly call reports. Our sample 
starts in March 1984,  just after a major revidon of the reports (this means ignoring quarterly 
loan sales data for December 1983), and ends in March 1993. Loan purchases start later, in 
1987:IIQ. Foreign-owned banks are flagged via identifier number "Bank 9360," which counts 
foreign bank agencies and branches, and U.S. banks with foreign majority ownership.4 
Figure 1 plots the aggregate level of all loans sold and loan sales by the branches and 
agencies of foreign banks.  Figure 2 plots sales and purchases as a percentage of C&I loans. 
Note the explosion in the loan sales market between 1986 and 1988, and the subsequent collapse 
This identifier also picks up New York State investment companies and Edge Act 
corporations with a majority foreign ownership, but our sample excludes those types of 
corporations, both foreign and domestic.  A branch can accept deposits from U.  S. citizens, but 
an agency cannot. See Spong (1990), pp. 134-35. 
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growth in 1990. Also note the large difference between sales and purchases--indicating the 
many loans that flow from the U.S. banking system either overseas or to nonbanks.5 
Figure 3 shows intriguing evidence of overseas influence on the market, in the similarity 
between loan sales and the Nikkei index.  This suggests the possibility that over the past decade, 
Japanese banks were major demanders of loans, and that their purchases corresponded to the 
level of hidden reserves they possessed.6 
Berger and Ude11(1992), Demsetz (1993), and Haubrich and Thomson (1993) suggest 
that a substantial portion of the run-up and subsequent decline of loan sales volume in late 1980s 
can be accounted for by the behavior of two banks:  Security Pacific National Bank and Trust 
Company and Bankers Trust of New York.  Figure 4 shows that controlling for Security Pacific 
and Bankers Trust is important in understanding the growth and collapse of this market. 
Figure 5 plots loan purchases as a percentage of C&I loans.  For domestic banks, this 
share was relatively flat from 1988 through the end of 199  1, with an upward trend from the first 
quarter of 1992 through the end of 1993. Foreign-controlled banks show a somewhat different 
pattern, as their loan purchases as a share of C&I loans declined from the second quarter of 
1988 through the third quarter of 1991 and increased thereafter. 
One popular explanation links the loan sales market with the mergers and acquisitions  - 
(M&A) market.  However, Haubrich and Thomson (1993) show that M&A volume was 
simply too small to account for the level of loan sales.  Furthermore, the level of M&As 
cannot explain either the rise or fall of loan sales volume. 
Unlike U.S. banks, Japanese banks are allowed to own equities.  Stocks are recorded on the 
balance sheet at acquisition cost, not at market value.  Therefore, capital gains and losses on 
the Japanese banks' stock portfolio are not reflected in book equity and represent a "hidden 
reserve."  When the international risk-adjusted capital standards were adopted in 1988, 
Japanese banks were allowed to count 50 percent of the net unrecorded gains on their stock 
portfolios toward Tier 1 capital. 
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The empirical work using the call reports runs the dependent variable, loan sales or loan 
purchases, against a set of independent variables that proxy for individual bank characteristics 
and market conditions. We first use the entire available sample for loan sales and purchases.  We 
next use a more restricted time period for which we have data on off-balance-sheet items and on 
highly leveraged transactions. This gives us more explanatory variables but a shorter time frame. 
Table 1 outlines variable definitions for the econometric work.  Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for domestic banks and foreign-controlled banks for the end of 1992. 
To provide a benchmark case, we first ran ordinary least squares. While the parameter 
estimates were all highly. significant, the ~2 is extremely low. This result is not so surprising, 
because many banks do not sell loans:  Of the 488,000 observations, 301,000 had no loan sales. 
In the interest of space those results are not reported here. 
Econometrically correcting for the large number of zero observations for the dependent 
variable required the use of a limited dependent variable method. We use Tobit, instead of logit 
or probit, because we do not wish to ignore the information about the quantity of loans sold (or 
bought).7 Figure 6 shows the importance of this distinction. The variation in sales comes not 
from changes in the number of banks selling, but rather in the volume of loans sold by banks in 
the market.  A greater percentage of foreign banks sell loans than the national average; however, 
the major increase in sales volume coincided with a major decrease in the percent selling. 
Loan Sales 
We estimate the model over the entire sample, a subsample restricted to domestic banks, 
and a foreign-controlled bank subsample. The full sample results are not significantly different, 
statistically or economically, from those of the domestic sample.  Therefore, in the interest of 
For other interesting approaches, see Pave1 and Phillis (1987) and Berger and Udell (1992). 
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(1993) for a detailed discussion of the model and the empirical results. 
Table 3 presents the estimated and expected signs for the loan sales equation. The 
dependent variable, LSRAT (the ratio of loans sold to total assets) is regressed against 19 
independent variables. Definitions of the variables used in the study can be found in table 1. Five 
of these are dummy variables to control for different size classes of banks.  Another five dummy 
variables indicate the banks' regional location (Southeast, Midwest, High Plains, Southwest, and 
West).  Seven variables (CAPRAT, HOTRAT, HOLDCO, TTASS, CHRRAT, NLRAT, and 
NETIMARG) are introduced to proxy for individual bank characteristics.  These variables 
capture banks' size, capital position, use of the national money market, and position on lending. 
They act as a natural starting place for an examination of the determinants of loan sales. Finally, 
TSPRD and BAASPRD are included to proxy for general market conditions. 
Our focus is on how the loan sales determinants differ between domestic and foreign- 
controlled institutions. We first split the sample and compared the results.  How differently do 
foreign banks behave? Panels A and B of table 4 address this question, reporting the results of 
the Tobit specification run on domestic banks only and on foreign banks. 
The first noticeable difference is the effect of size. For domestic banks, the coefficients 
on the size dummies (DSZ1-DSZS) and on TTASS (the log of total assets) are negative and 
significant. The size dummies indicate a positive relationship between size and loan sales. 
However, the negative coefficient on TTASS suggests that within a particular size class, the 
larger a bank becomes, the fewer loans it sells.  In the foreign bank sample, the dummies indicate 
that large foreign banks sell relatively fewer loans than do smaller banks.  Interestingly, however, 
the coefficient on total assets also reverses sign, so it appears that within a given size class, 
larger foreign banks do sell more. 
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insignificant for foreign banks, as does the net interest margin. Haubrich and Thomson (1993) 
argue that high net interest margins indicate a bank with a good supply of profitable loan 
opportunities.  Therefore, the positive and significant coefficient on the net interest margin for 
the domestic subsample suggests that a bank with good lending opportunities makes a lot of 
loans, some of which it sells and some of which it keeps on its balance sheet.  On the other hand, 
the insignificant coefficient on NETIMARG supports the idea that foreign banks have somewhat 
different incentives to sell loans. Perhaps they sell loans to parents overseas, and the 
diversification factor predominates, making the relative supply and demand story less important. 
The most striking change, though not involving a sign reversal, occurs on the coefficient 
for CAPRAT, the capital ratio. At a level of -0.024 for domestic banks, it attains -0.177 for the 
foreign banks, and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. The negative and significant 
relationship between capital and loan sales is consistent with Pennacchi's (1988) theoretical 
model and with Haubrich and Thomson (1993).  A decrease in capital has a much larger effect 
on loan sales for foreign banks.  This may result from a greater concern with capital adequacy 
among foreign banks, but it also suggests that these banks use the loan sales market more 
aggressively to adjust their leverage. In addition, to the extent that foreign banks sell these loans 
to their overseas parent banks or to offshore international bank facilities, the significant effect of 
capita9 on loan sales is consistent with the use of this market to reallocate assets within the 
parent company in order to minimize fbnding costs (see McCauley and Seth [1992]). 
The distinctiveness of foreign banks is codinned by  looking at the shorter period for 
which we have data on highly leveraged transactions, reported in table 5.  The data for highly 
leveraged transactions exist only from 1991  :IQ to 1992:IIIQ. Two aspects of the HLT equations 
stand out.  The coefficient on the capital ratio again becomes larger and economically more 
significant in the foreign bank equation. It likewise retains its negative sign in the HLT sample, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmunlike domestic banks, for which CAPRAT switches signs to positive in moving from the full 
sample to the HLT sample.  Only foreign banks show a  statistically significant coefficient on 
both new variables, HLTRAT and OFFRAT.  The general importance of HLT activity most 
likely represents a "merchant banking" stance of several banks, which engage in a variety of 
highly technical financial activities, including loan sales. More directly, because HLT loans are 
more apt to be sold, a large presence in the HLT market indicates a propensity to sell loans.  The 
importance of OFFRAT in the foreign bank equation shows that for foreign banks, at least, these 
are conceptually different activities and suggests that foreign banks which pursue off-balance- 
sheet activities more aggressively will also sell more loans. 
Loan Purchases 
The equations for loan purchases are estimated over a shorter sample period because 
data on purchases are not available until 1987:IIQ. Tobit analysis again is the appropriate 
estimation technique because most banks did not purchase loans, though foreign-controlled 
banks were more likely to have done so, as figure 7 indicates. 
Table 6 presents the expected and estimated signs for the loan purchase equation.  Table 
7 again splits the banks, with panel A reporting the Tobit purchase results for domestic banks, 
and panel B for foreign banks. Once again, notice that the foreign sample is much smaller and 
therefore less precisely estimated. 
Except for some size dummies, the results for domestic banks look almost identical to 
those for the full sample. Therefore, the full sample results are not presented here (again, the 
interested reader is referred to Haubrich and Thomson for a detailed discussion of the model). 
The results for the foreign banks are markedly different from the domestic bank results, 
especially in the capital and the market measures.  CAPRAT changes sign, to positive, and is no 
longer statistically significant.  The market variables, TSPRD and BAASPRD, also lose their 
significance. Once again, foreign banks respond differently to important motives in a way 
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other markets may make our interest-rate proxy less relevant to their true problem. 
The ratio of loan sales to assets (LSRAT) for foreign banks drops markedly in 
significance and its coefficient is considerably smaller, 0.073, than for the domestic bank sample 
(1.8 16). This probably reflects the larger size and greater involvement of foreign banks in 
trading activities.  Another reason may be the use of loan purchases by foreign banks to build 
loan volume and market share. 
The results for the HLT sample mirror most of these changes, as the shift in CAPRAT 
and the loss of significance of market variables in table 8 make clear.  In addition, the charge-off 
ratio changes sign and becomes insignificant. For domestic banks, the negative charge-off 
coefficient clearly points to a "comparative advantage" explanation for loan purchases.  Some 
banks excel at identieing and investing in loans; the positive coefficient on net loans and leases 
supports this.  Foreign banks as a group, however, are probably not in this class. They may find 
it more difficult to acquire the expertise and, as mentioned before, the diversification motive may 
predominate, swamping the differences in relative ability.  For the HLT variables themselves, 
even with the smaller sample size, the foreign bank equation shows significant coefficients for 
both off-balance-sheet volume and highly leveraged transactions. 
B.  Equity Influences 
Earlier, figure 3 suggested a connection between loan sales and Japanese stock prices. 
The connection makes sense, because stock prices affect the level of "hidden reserves" that 
augment the capital position of Japanese banks.  With a strong capital position, the banks could 
lend to a great extent, putting them in the market  for U.S. loans.  As hidden reserves fall, bank 
lending declines, depressing the market for loans. 
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Tobit regression, adding stock market indices for Japan, Hong Kong, Seoul, and Singapore. It 
also adds dummies for the home country of foreign-controlled banks in the United States-- 
Britain, Canada, Latin America, Japan, other East Asia, and other Asia. 
Table 9 reports some intriguingly paradoxical results. Despite the large presence of the 
Japanese banks in the loan sales market, the dummy for Japan enters with a negative sign: 
Everything else equal (which it isn't ), Japanese banks sell fewer loans.  This is perhaps less of a 
paradox than it initially appears. It suggests that many countries do not repatriate loans directly 
fiom their U.S. affiliate, but buy them in the larger market. The split between the negative 
correlation of Japanese, European, and other East Asian banks and the positive correlation of 
Canadian and Latin American banks may bear this out, as the New World banks may find it 
easier to obtain the information necessary to originate loans in the United States.  The other 
banks find it easier to buy loans originated by other banks. 
Additional insight into the Japanese-owned bank results can be found in McCauley and 
Seth (1992).  In looking at the holdings of U.S. commercial loans by on- and offshore affiliates 
of foreign banks, these authors found that the Japanese banks held most of their U.S. corporate 
loans on the books of their onshore affiliates.  Therefore, Japanese-owned banks in the United 
States are less likely to use the loan sales market to transfer assets to offshore banking facilities 
than are other foreign bank subsidiaries. Clearly, offshore booking of C&I loans by foreign 
banks accounts for some of the difference between the volume of loans sold and purchased by 
domestically chartered banks in the United States. 
Despite the apparent correlation of aggregate values in figure 3, loan sales on the 
individual bank level show a negative relation with the Nikkei index. Statistically, the coefficient 
is highly significant, but no general pattern emerges across the other indices.  The message of 
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with macroeconomic and trade variables that influence the level of loan sales. 
5.  Conclusion 
Loan sales prefigure major changes in the role of banks as intermediaries.  Fully comprehending 
this change requires understanding the forces driving the loan sales market. Foreign banks and 
their domestic branches play a distinctive role, which we analyze by looking at the determinants 
of loan sales and purchases. 
This micro-level approach yields several insights missed by considering aggregate levels. 
For example, despite the large presence of Japanese banks in the market,  everything else equal, 
Japanese banks sell fewer of the loans than do domestic banks.  Likewise, despite an impressive 
casual correlation between the Nikkei index and loan sales,  on an individual bank level, the 
relation is actually negative. 
Foreign banks often respond differently than do domestic banks to the determinants of 
loan sales and purchases.  In some ways, most notably with respect to capital, they show 
themselves to be more sensitive than domestic banks.  In other ways, such as charge-offs and 
bond market conditions, they show themselves to be less sensitive. It would make little sense to 
fit the many disparate results to a Procrustean bed, but the evidence broadly fits a consistent 
interpretation of the market.  Foreign banks use loan sales as a diversification tool, perhaps 
having more to gain.  This strategy makes them less sensitive to nuances that U.S. banks find 
more important, such as the term structure or their relative expertise in originating loans. 
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The ratio of loans sold to total assets. 
The ratio of loans purchased to total assets. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Southeast. Equals 1 if the bank is in the 
Richmond or Atlanta Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Midwest. Equals 1 if the bank is in the 
Cleveland, Chicago, or St. Louis Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located on the High Plains. Equals 1 if the bank is in 
the Minneapolis or Kansas City Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the Southwest. Equals 1 if the bank is in 
the Dallas Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for banks located in the West. Equals 1 if the bank is in the San 
Francisco Federal Reserve District. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are less than $50 million, and 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $50 million and 
$1  00 million, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size. Equals 1 if total assets are between $100 million and 
$500 million, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $500 million and 
$1 billion, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for size.  Equals 1 if total assets are between $1 billion and $5 
billion, and 0 otherwise. 
The ratio of bank capital to total assets. 
The ratio of "hot" hnds to total assets, that is, deposits above $100,000, 
brokered deposits, foreign deposits, and Fed hnds purchased. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmHOLDCO  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is part of a holding company, 0 if it is 
not. 
TTASS  The log of total assets. 
CHRRAT  The ratio of total charge-offs net of recoveries (a measure of losses on loans) to 
total assets. 
NLRAT  The ratio of net loans and leases to total assets. 
1.WTIMARG  The net interest margin of the bank: total interest income less total interest costs 
all divided by total assets. 
TSPRD  The spread between 30-year Treasury bonds and 90-day Treasury bills at the 
beginning of each quarter. 
BAASPRD  The spread between Standard & Poor's Baa bond portfolio and 90-day Treasury 
bills. 
OFFRAT  The ratio of off-balance-sheet activities, exclusive of loan sales, to total assets. 
HLTRAT  The ratio of loans for highly leveraged transactions to total assets. 
DWMBRI  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in the British Isles, 0 
otherwise. 
DUMCAN  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in Canada, 0 otherwise. 
DUMEUR  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in continental Europe, 0 
otherwise. 
DUMLAT  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in Latin America, 0 
otherwise. 
DUMJAP  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in Japan, 0 otherwise. 
DUMOAS  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in the Middle East, zero 
otherwise. 
DUMOEAS  Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign parent is located in a Pacific Rim nation 
exluding Japan, or in India, zero otherwise. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmJAPIND  The NIKKEI 225 Stock Average. Price-weighted average of 225 stocks listed in 
the first section of the Tokyo Exchange (account for 60 percent of market value 
of listed stocks). 
HKONGIND  The Hong Kong Hang Seng Stock Index. Capitalization-weighted index of 33 
highly capitalized stocks from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
SEOLJLIND  The Seoul Composite Index.  Capitalization-weighted index of all listed 
companies on the Korea Stock Exchange. 
SINGIND  The Singapore SES All-Singapore Index.  Capitalization-weighted index of all 
shares trading on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 2:  Summary Statistics as of Year-End 1992 
A.  Domestic Banks 
Total Assets  Number  Total 
I$ millions)  of Banks  Assetsa  Loan Salesa  Loan Purchasesa 
B.  Foreign Banks 
Total Assets  Number  Total 
I$ millions)  of Banks  Assetsa  Loan Salesa  Loan Purchasesa 
a. Total assets, loan sales, and loan purchases are in billions of dollars. 
b.  Numbers in parentheses are sales and purchases .as a percentage of total assets. 
SOURCE:  FFIEC Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, December 1992. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 3:  Estimated and Expected Signs 
Loan Sales--Tobit Regressions 
Proxy  Expected  Haubrich &  Domestic  Foreign 


































*  - 
++ 
NOTES:  a.  The DUMSW was excluded from the foreign bank Tobits to avoid a singular matrix. 
*  Insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
'f  Significantly different from the domestic bank sample at the 1 percent level. 
Significantly different from the domestic bank sample at the 5 percent level. 
SOURCES: Authors' calculations and Haubrich and Thomson (1993). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 4:  Loan Sales, Full Sample 
A.  Tobit Regressions, Domestic Banks Only 
Total Values = 484,874 
Left Censored Values = 299,627 
Log Likelihood for Normal -132,370 























clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 4:  Loan Sales, Full Sample 
B.  Tobit Regressions, Foreign Banks Only 
Total  Values = 3,071 
Left Censored Values = 1,509 
Log Likelihood for Normal -106.19 























SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 5:  Loan Sales, HLT Sample 
A.  Domestic Banks Only 
Total Values = 71,089 
Left Censored Values = 45,537 
Log Likelihood for Normal 879.41 
























Std Err  t Stat 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 5:  Loan Sales, HLT Sample 
B.  Foreign Banks Only 
Total Values = 532 
Left Censored Values = 299 
Log Likelihood for Normal 251.70 























Std Err  t Stat 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 6:  Estimated and Expected Signs 































NOTES:  a. DUMSW was excluded to avoid a singular matrix. 
* Insignificant at  the 5 percent level. 
t  Significantly different from the domestic bank sample at  the 1 percent level. 
$  Significantly different from the domestic bank sample at  the 5 percent level. 
SOURCES:  Authors' calculations and Haubrich and Thomson (1993). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 7:  Loan Purchases, Full Sample 
A.  Tobit Regressions, Domestic Banks Only 
Total Values = 299,384 
Left Censored Values =207,693 
Log Likelihood for Normal -19,913 
























clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 7:  Loan Purchases, Full Sample 
B.  Tobit Regressions, Foreign Banks Only 
Total  Values = 2,121 
Left' Censored Values = 1,359 
Log Likelihood for Normal 609.09 
























SOURCE:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 8:  Loan Purchases, HLT Sample 
A.  Domestic Banks Only 
Total Values = 71,089 
Left Censored Values = 49,155 
Log Likelihood for Normal 9,765 

























Std Error  t-stat 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 8:  Loan Purchases, HLT Sample 
B.  Foreign Banks Only 
Total Values = 532 
Left Censored Values = 376 
Log Likelihood for Normal 213.13 
























Std Err  t Stat 
SOURCE:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTABLE 9:  Foreign Stock Markets and Loan Sales 
Total  Values = 168,258 
Left Censored Values = 107,149 
Log Likelihood for Normal -71,505 


































Std Err  t Stat 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 4 
LOAN SALES 
Billions of dollars 
300 
Actual loan sales 
..................... 
......................................................... 
Loan sales excluding Bankers Trust of New York and 
Source:  FFIEC Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income. 
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